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NOTES
MINERAL ROYALTIES-. PROBLEMS OF
USE FOR INTERRUPTION OF
LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
The mineral law of Louisiana, aside from conservation legis-
lation, has been developed almost entirely on a case by case basis.
As a result of this piecemeal development, persons are uncertain
of rights arising from mineral transactions until court review
is completed. One area of mineral law still uncertain is that
of interruption of liberative prescription running against a min-
eral royalty interest. A mineral royalty interest is the right to
a portion of minerals actually produced, or their proceeds, the
right not being limited to a specific lease.'
Although the mineral royalty was first defined as a real
right attached to the land and subject to ten-year liberative pre-
scription, 2 the Louisiana Supreme Court, distinguishing it from
a mineral servitude later characterized the royalty as "a condi-
tional obligation, depending on an uncertain event, that pre-
scribed in ten years if the event did not happen prior thereto. ' 3
It has been suggested that this later characterization is incon-
sistent with the application of ten year liberative prescription as
"the contract . . . would be suspended until the occurrence of
the event upon which it is conditioned . . .; and, hence, the ap-
plicable liberative prescription would commence to run only from
that time."' 4 It has been further suggested5 that this inconsist-
ency may be resolved by characterizing the royalty as an uncon-
ditional right which is subject to ten-year prescription for non-
use,6 as are the traditional real rights, and that the claims arising
from the royalty are subject to a suspensive condition. Upon
the happening of the condition, liberative prescription of ten
1. This type mineral royalty was first established in Vincent v. Bullock, 192
La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939). I.t is to be distinguished from the sale by a lessor of
his share of production in a specific mineral lease as in Calcasieu Oil Co. v.
Yount-Lee Oil Co., 174 La. 547, 141 So. 55 (1932) and from the sale of a fraction
of the lessee's operating interest in a lease, the so-called "overriding" royalty, as
in Wier v. Glassell, 216 La. 828, 44 So. 2d 882 (1950), and in Arkansas Fuel Oil
Co. v. Gary, 70 So. 2d 144 (La. App. 1954).
2. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 2, 187 So. 35 (1939).
3. St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 619, 33 So. 2d 169, 172
(1947).
4. Concurring opinion by Hamiter, J., in St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney,
212 La. 605, 622, 33 So. 2d 169, 174 (1947).
5. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comnparatire Law: Part I, 23
LA. L. REV. 161, 204-05 (1963).
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3546 (1870).
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years, applicable to the enforcement of personal actions, 7 begins
to run against the enforcement of those claims.
Whichever conceptual basis is applied to the mineral royalty,
it is clear that the existence of the mineral royalty is dependent
on either production8 or a clear acknowledgment of the royalty
owner's interest" before the end of the prescriptive period. That
the acknowledgment must be in formal terms, as is necessary to
acknowledge a mineral servitude, is fairly clear, 10 but the ques-
tion of what constitutes production has not been satisfactorily
answered. It is established, however, that the mineral royalty
owner has no rights or obligations concerning the actual mineral
development of the property." The existence of the mineral
royalty thus depends upon achievement of production by one
who has the development rights, either as mineral owner or
lessee. Cast in this light, it would appear that the mineral roy-
alty may be subject to a purely potestative condition, especially
since it has been held that the mineral owner and the lessee are
under no obligation to seek production in order to preserve the
mineral royalty owner's interest.12 The mineral royalty however,
has not been held void because subject to a purely potestative
condition since the landowner would suffer a real detriment if
he failed to develop his land." The result is that the mineral
royalty is a passive right which neither gives the royalty owner
rights to develop nor makes him a necessary party to a mineral
lease. 14 He is limited to the mere right to share in the production
of oil, gas, and minerals, if and when they are produced."
Since production is required, the commencement of drilling
before the expiration of ten years which results in a dry hole 6
7. Id. art. 3544.
8. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 la. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
9. Union Sulphur v. l.ognion, 212 La. 632, 644, 33 So. 2d 178, 182 (1947).
10. See Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d
375 (1960); Union Oil Co. of California v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 80 So. 2d 50
(1956) ; Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, .187 So. :-5 (1939).
11. Vincent v. Bullock. 192 L.a. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
12. Uzee v. Bollinger, 178 So. 2d 508 (L.a. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
13. Iumble Oil & Refining Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So. 2d 182 (1947).
In other words, it is felt that the landowner, although lie could refrain from leasing
in order to defeat the mineral royalty, would not be entirely free as he stands to
suffer economic loss by refusing to develop. The distinction is that though the
existence of the royalty interest depends on the landowner's (obligor's) will, a
potestative condition under l.A. CIVIL COnE art. 2034 (1870), it is not such a
potestative condition (purely potestative) as will make the contract void under
art. 2035.
14. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So. 2d 182 (1947).
15. Ibid.
16. St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947).
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or which results in production after the expiration of ten years 17
will not interrupt the running of prescription. Even if a well is
drilled and it shows traces of oil and gas when tested before
the end of ten years, prescription is not interrupted if actual
production is not achieved until after the expiration of the pre-
scription period.'
Thus only production will interrupt the running of prescrip-
tion; but must that production be from the property subject to
the mineral royalty? It has been determined that when a min-
eral royalty is sold under a single deed covering several non-
contiguous tracts, production on one tract within ten years will
not interrupt prescription accruing against the other tracts.19
But where the royalty tract is wholly included within a drilling
unit,20 prescription may be interrupted by production off the
royalty tract if within the unit. There exists a great deal of
confusion, however, if the royalty tract is only partially included
in a drilling unit. If the unit is voluntarily formed and no divi-
sion of the use requirements is implied in the contract, inter-
ruption by production is applicable to. the whole royalty tract.2 1
If it is a compulsory unit, however, production on the unit but
off the royalty tract interrupts prescription only as to the por-
tion included in the unit.22
Just as unitization has had an impact on production applica-
ble to the interruption of prescription, so has the so-called "shut-
in" well. A well is "shut-in" (this is particularly applicable to
gas wells) when minerals are not drawn off because no market
or pipeline is available to receive production, or some govern-
mental quota restrictions are in force. Union Oil Co. of Califor-
nia v. Touchet,23 the first case presented to the Supreme Court
for a determination of the effect of a shut-in well on prescrip-
tion, involved a unitized well located off the royalty tract, ca-
17. Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion. 212 La. 632, 33 So. 2d 178 (1947).
18. Union Sulphur Co. v. Andrau, 217 La. 662, 47 So. 2d 38 (1950).
19. Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949).
20. Within the meaning of LA. R.S. 30:9B (1950) ("the maximum area which
may be efficiently and economically drained by one well"). This unit may be
either formed voluntarily under LA. R.S. 30:10A (1950), or formed under 30 :9B.
. _21.-Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. BArousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575
(1960) ; Montie v. Sabine Royalty Co., 161 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
22. Frey v. Miller, 165 So. 2d 43 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964). Further discussion
of these conflicts is beyond the scope of this Note, but for an excellent dis-
cussion of the effects of forced and voluntary pooling orders, see Hardy, Rumina-
tions on the Effect of Conservation Laws and Practices on the Louisiana Mineral
Servitude and Royalty, 25 LA. L. REV. 824 (1965).
23. 229 La. 316, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956).
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pable of producing, but shut-in for lack of market. The court
indicated that the royalty owner's right to share in production
would not be lost, in accord with the Louisiana Conservation
Act provision that: "This unit shall constitute a developed area
as long as a well is located thereon which is capable of produc-
ing oil or gas in paying quantities. ' 24 The royalty owner's claim
was ultimately rejected in Touchet on the ground that the drill-
ing unit had not been validly formed before the running of
prescription,25 thus the statements on the effect of the shut-in
were dicta. However, the same court, relying on the Touchet
dicta, held in LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 26 that the
royalty interest was preserved when the royalty tract was validly
included within a unit on which a shut-in well was completed
prior to the running of liberative prescription.
It was suggested in Odom v. Union Producing Co. 27 that
LeBlanc was based on a stipulation in the lease agreement that
"in lieu" royalty payments would be made to the lessor if a well
was shut-in. But that suggestion failed to consider Delatte v.
Woods,'2 in which the Supreme Court cited Touchet and LeBlanc
as holding that, "the completion and existence of a shut-in gas
well on a validly created unit are equivalent to production on all
tracts in order to interrupt the prescription accruing against
royalty interest and preserve same from extinction by prescrip-
tion.".29 Further, a close reading of LeBlanc supports the state-
ment made in Delatte, which seems to be the better view since
it would not be reasonable to make the royalty owner's rights
depend on a stipulation in a lease contract to which he is not
even a necessary party.30
The most recent case dealing with a shut-in well on acreage
unitized with the royalty tract is Lee v. Goodwin,31 in which the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal held the mineral royalty was pre-
served beyond the ten-year prescriptive period. Although the Su-
preme Court refused writs, stating there was no error of law in
the lower court's judgment, Justice Summers wrote a strong dis-
sent contending that actual or constructive production (payment
24. LA. R.S. 30:9B (1950).
25. 229 La. 316, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956).
26. 230 La. 299, 88 So. 2d 377 (1956).
27. 243 La. 48, 141 So. 2d 649 (1962).
28. 232 La. 341, 94 So. 2d 281 (1957).
29. Id. at 358, 94 So. 2d at 287.
30. See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
31. 174 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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of shut-in royalties) and not a mere shut-in well is required to
interrupt prescription. 2 Concededly, the cases Justice Summers
cites33 require production for the interruption of liberative pre-
scription, but the question is whether a shut-in well constitutes
production, and the answer apparently given by the appellate
court is that a shut-in well does constitute production for pre-
scriptive purposes. 3  Justice Summers questions the appellate
court's reliance on LeBlanc' 5 in Lee v. Goodwin 6 in the face of
the Odom3 7 decision which characterized the LeBlanc result as
based on the presence of the "in lieu" royalties as constructive
production.3 8 This argument lacks validity, however, as is sug-
gested above. Further, he questions the appellate court's reli-
ance on Touchet3 9 as he believes the statement that a shut-in
well constitutes production was dictum.
Whether or not Justice Summers was correct in his criticism
of Lee v. Goodwin,40 his dissent illustrates the lack of certainty
in the area, and the Supreme Court seems to have passed an
opportunity to define exactly what constitutes production to
preserve the existence of the mineral royalty.
Denial of writs in Lee v. Goodwin seems to indicate that the
Supreme Court considers that a shut-in well preserves the min-
eral royalty beyond the ten-year prescriptive period. This raises
the question, however, whether the shut-in well constitutes an
interruption of the ten-year prescription or merely suspends it
until the well is actually produced. The better view is that the
shut-in well merely suspends prescription, for then, if the well
should be abandoned without actual production, the time that
elapsed before suspension will be added to the time that accrues
after suspension ends. If, on the other hand, the shut-in well
interrupts prescription, the time that elapsed before the inter-
32. Lee v. Goodwin, 248 La. 149, 177 So. 2d 118 (1965).
33. Cases cited 'by Justice Summers include: Crown Central Petroleum Corp.
v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575 (1960) Union Oil & Gas Corp. of La.
v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96 (1959) ; Union Sulphur Co. v. Andrau,
217 La. 662, 47 So. 2d 38 (1950) ; Continental Oil Co. v. Landry. 215 La. 518,
41 So. 2d 73 (1949); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33
So. 2d 182 (1947); Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 33 So. 2d 178
(1947) ; St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 35 So. 2d 169 (1947);
Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
34. Lee v. Goodwin, 174 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
35. 230 La. 299, 88 So. 2d 377 (1956).
36. 174 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
37. 243 La. 48, 141 So. 2d 649 (1962).
38. See note 29 supra, and text accompanying.
39. 229 La. 316, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956).
40. 248 La. 149, 177 So. 2d 118 (1965).
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ruption is cancelled and prescription must start to run again
from the time the well is abandoned. In fairness to the land
or mineral owner, it would be best to say the presence of a
shut-in well suspends prescription in order to protect him from
a renewed royalty charge if the well is never actually produced.
The question then arises whether suspension may be applied
to the mineral royalty. Article 792 of the Louisiana Civil Code
provides, "If the owner of the estate to whom the servitude is
due is prevented from using it by any obstacle which he can
neither prevent nor remove, the prescription of non-usage does
not run against him as long as this obstacle remains." This arti-
cle might be deemed applicable to the mineral royalty since the
Supreme Court held in Vincent v. Bullock41 that the liberative
prescription applicable to servitudes 42 is applicable also to roy-
alties. The court held in that case, however, that the suspension
provided in art. 792 was inapplicbale as the royalty is not a
servitude; and since the royalty owner had no rights "to explore
and develop the minerals" there could be no obstacle to use
rights he did not have. It is submitted, however, that such a
holding is not broad enough to preclude the possibility of sus-
penion when there is an obstacle to the only use a mineral roy-
alty owner may make of the property, i.e., his right to share
in production.
It might be suggested that, since the royalty owner has no
rights or duties to develop the property 43 and is not even a nec-
essary party to a mineral lease involving the royalty tract,44 a
holding that a shut-in well will preserve the royalty interest is
desirable. If it were otherwise, the royalty owner would be at
the mercy of the mineral owner and his lessee, who might be
tempted to shut a well in to await the prescription of any royalty
interest then outstanding. Since it appears that the mineral
owner and the lessee owe no fiduciary duty to the royalty own-
er,45 this possibility is not remote.
Holding that a shut-in well will preserve a mineral royalty
is also justified since modern petroleum engineering techniques
make it possible to ascertain with reasonable certainty the capa-
bilities of a completed well. Because of this ability, the land-
41. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
42. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 789 (1870).
43. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 .a. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
44. Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 L.a. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949).
45. Uzee v. Bollinger, 178 So. 2d 508 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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owner or mineral owner could, on a proper showing, have the
mineral royalty declared extinguished if the shut-in well was in
fact not capable of production. The problem is in developing
testing standards high enough to be acceptable to the courts.
It may be concluded that there is a need for clarification of
what is required to preserve the mineral royalty. At present
the law seems to be that a well capable of producing, but shut-in
for some reason, will prevent the running of liberative prescrip-
tion. This seems to be true whether the shut-in well is located
on the royalty tract or on acreage unitized with the royalty
tract. But, more clarification is needed to stabilize royalty
transactions.
Lawrence L. Jones
PERSONAL OBLIGATIONS- RIGHT OF OBLIGEE TO RECOVER THE
UNEARNED PORTION OF THE CONTRACT PRICE WHEN His
DISABILITY MAKES PERFORMANCE IMPOSSIBLE
Plaintiff, whose physical incapacity prevented her comple-
tion of dancing lessons purchased from defendant dancing stu-
dio, sued to recover the price paid for the uncompleted lessons.
Held, plaintiff may recover the unearned portion of the purchase
price. Article 2003 of the Civil Code, which states that heirs
of an obligee of a personal obligation may recover from the
obligor the equivalent he received in case of the death of the
obligee, is applicable to the situation in which the obligee is
physically incapable of performing his part of the contract.
Acosta v. Cole, 178 So. 2d 456 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) ;1 writs
refused, 179 So. 2d 273, 179 So. 2d 274 (La. .1965).
The case presents two problems: the propriety of the court's
interpretation of article 2003, and the propriety of the court's
application of the article to the case.
Article 20032 first appeared in the Projet of the Civil Code
of 1825 and has no counterpart in earlier Louisiana law8 or in
the Code Napoleon. French doctrinal writing demonstrates that
1. See Richardson v. Cole, 173 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term- Obligations,
26 LA. L. REV. 494, 501 (1966).2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2003 (1870) : "In like manner, if the obligation be
purely personal as to the obligee who dies before performance, his heirs may
recover from the obligor the value of any equivalent he may have received."
3. Projet of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825- Redactor's Comment 272:
"The whole of this section is an addition to the Code. . . . The principles on
which it is founded have long been established in the civil law .... "
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